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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After having been granted a new trial based on the Idaho Supreme Court's
conclusion that Corporal Fred Rice, an expert accident reconstructionist employed by
the Idaho State Police, testified falsely for the State at his first trial, Jonathan Ellington's
second-degree murder/aggravated battery case was remanded for a second trial.
During the second trial, the State offered the testimony of a different accident
reconstruction expert-John Daily. Mr. Daily, like Cpl. Rice before him, testified falsely.
When new evidence of the falsity of Mr. Daily's testimony (i.e., material in a
textbook co-authored by Mr. Daily, which showed that Mr. Daily's critical calculations
and conclusions were dependent upon a formula that had no application in this case)
came to light shortly after Mr. Ellington's second trial, he promptly filed a motion for a
new trial. That motion, however, was denied by the district court.
On appeal, Mr. Ellington contends that the district court erred by denying his
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

He argues first that

because, under the four-prong standard set forth in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685
(1976), the district court should have granted his motion for a new trial, the district
court's order should be reversed and his case should be remanded for a new trial.
Alternatively, he contends that, to the extent that the district court failed (owing to its
misapprehension of the nature of the new evidence) to make the findings necessary for
this Court to affirmatively hold that Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial was required to
have been granted, this Court should vacate the district court's order and remand the
case for further proceedings on the motion for a new trial.
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In response, the State does not address Mr. Ellington's alternative contention; it
simply argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ellington's
motion for a new trial. Specifically, the State claims that Mr. Ellington failed to satisfy
any of the four prongs of the Drapeau test.
The purpose of the present reply brief is to walk through each of the four parts of
the Drapeau test and explain why the State's arguments with respect to each part are
without merit.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in
Mr. Ellington's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, should require no further mention herein.
However, because the State's own statement of facts could create some confusion,
some clarification is required.
In his opening brief, Mr. Ellington asserted that, "The basic facts of this case
were summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court in the appeal following Mr. Ellington's
first trial," and he went on to block-quote the facts as recited by the Supreme Court in
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,56-58 (2011) (hereinafter, Ellington I). (App. Br., pp.15.)

In relying on the Supreme Court's recitation of the facts from Ellington I,

Mr. Ellington offered the caveat that, "The Supreme Court's recitation of the facts is
obviously derived from the evidence adduced at Mr. Ellington's first trial, not the most
recent trial.

However, that evidence, at least as summarized in Ellington I, is

substantially identical to the evidence adduced at Mr. Ellington's second triaL" (App.
Br., p.5 n.2.) Further, Mr. Ellington identified a critical area in which the evidence from
the first trial deviated from that of the second trial. (See App. Br., p.5 n.2.)
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In its own statement of facts, the State also relies on a block-quote from

Ellington I. (See Resp. Sr., pp.1-2.) In doing so though, the State arguably creates
some confusion. This is so for a number of reasons.
First, while the State initially indicates that its recitation of the facts is derived
from its own previous description of the underlying facts (Resp. Br., p.1), after providing
a lengthy block-quote of the alleged facts, the State incorrectly cites to Mr. Ellington's
Appellant's Brief from Ellington I, instead of its own Respondent's Brief from that prior
appeal (see Resp. Br., p.2). While this is undoubtedly a simple typographical error by
the State, Mr. Ellington wishes to make it clear that the State's version of the "facts" is
its own; he has not, and will not, endorse the "facts" asserted by the State on pages 1
and 2 of its Respondent's Brief.
Second, the State's recitation of the "facts" is more of an argument than a true
statement of the evidence.

The State's summary of the events underlying the

charges/convictions in this case "cherry picks" from the evidence, presenting the State's
theories as if they are established facts. The State makes no attempt to point out that
many of its claims are contested by Mr. Ellington, see Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 57 n.1
("We understand ... that the facts regarding how the incident began and progressed
are contest by Mr. Ellington."), or even to note where its factual claims are in conflict
with its own evidence. For example, in describing the U-turn that allowed Mr. Ellington
to escape the Larsen girls the first time they chased him, the State asserts that, "[a]fter
turning around, Ellington drove his vehicle in the wrong lane directly at the girls,

swerving at the last instant into the other lane." (Resp. Br., p.1 (quoting #33843 Resp.
Br., p.2) (emphasis added).)

However, while the Larsen girls may have, at times,
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attempted to portray Mr. Ellington as having nearly struck them, the fact is that, during
Mr. Ellington's second trial, Jovon was confronted with her prior sworn testimony in
which she had admitted that Mr. Ellington swerved out of the girls' lane while he was still
a "long ways" away. (See Tr., p.1248, L.16 - p.1252, L.14.)
As another example, the State asserts that, in the split second before
Mr. Ellington's Blazer struck Vonette Larsen, "Ellington made a hard left and
accelerated toward Vonette Larsen .... " (Resp. Br., p.2 (quoting #33843 Resp. Br., p.3
(emphasis added).) However, the State's own evidence (a scale diagram, prepared by
the State's reconstruction expert, John Daily) demonstrates that after Mr. Ellington
disengaged his Blazer from the girls' Honda, he had to accelerate around their vehicle
to flee to open road and, in doing so, he only veered slightly left of the straight path that
whould have taken him to the correct lane of travel. See Ex. 80N (diagram showing
Mr. E"ington's acceleration marks as he went around the Honda and continued driving
slightly left instead of regaining the correct lane of travel). The State also neglects to
mention that Mr. Ellington veered left just as Joel Larsen, who was just outside the right
side of the Blazer, pointed a .44 Magnum at his head and then discharged that massive
handgun into the engine compartment of his Blazer.

(See Tr., p.546, L.12 - p.550,

L.15.)
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Ellington submits that the State's statement of "facts"
should be viewed with some skepticism.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial where there was
newly-discovered evidence showing that the State's retained accident reconstruction
expert testified falsely at Mr. Ellington's trial?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Ellington's Motion For A New Trial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ellington has argued on appeal that the district court erred in denying his

motion for a new trial, which was based on newly-discovered evidence.

The new

evidence is a passage in a textbook co-authored by the State's accident reconstruction
expert, John Daily-which shows that Mr. Daily testified falsely at Mr. Ellington's trial. In
particular, it shows that Mr. Daily gave false testimony when he claimed that a certain
rotational mechanics formula could be used to determine whether the impact of the
Larsens' Subaru caused Mr. Ellington's Blazer to rotate toward the Larsen daughters'
Honda, and that he gave false and misleading testimony when he opined, based on his
calculations using that formula, that Mr. Ellington steered his Blazer into the girls'
Honda.
In evaluating Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial based on this newly discovered
evidence, the district court failed to grasp the nature of the newly-discovered evidence.
Accordingly, its analysis of Mr. Ellington's motion was flawed from the outset and its
ultimate conclusion-that Mr. Ellington was not entitled to a new trial-was in error. In
this appeal, Mr. Ellington has argued that when the relevant legal standard is applied to
the correct evidence, it is apparent that he is entitled to a new trial, and he asks this
Court to order as much. Alternatively, he asserts that, because the district court failed
to grasp the nature of the new evidence, at a minimum, his case should be remanded to
the district court for consideration of the newly-discovered evidence in light of the
controlling standard.
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In response, the State does not address Mr. Ellington's alternative argument.
Instead, it simply argues that Mr. Ellington failed to satisfy any of the four parts of the
test applicable to motions for new trials based on newly-discovered evidence and,
therefore, the district court was correct to have denied Mr. Ellington's motion.
The present reply is necessary to go through the applicable new trial standard
and explain why the State's arguments are without merit.
B.

ARRlicable Legal Standards
Because the parties generally seem to agree that the Drapeau test applies in this

case, 1 and that the district court's application of that test should be reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, no further discussion of the applicable legal standards is required.
C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Ellington's Motion For A New Trial
Because Mr. Ellington Satisfied The Four-Part Test For A New Trial Under
State v. Drapeau
As noted, the new evidence in this case must be evaluated under the four-part

Drapeau test. Applying that standard to the claim actually raised, Mr. Ellington asserts

that he is entitled to a new trial. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington, analyzed each of
the four prongs of the Drapeau test and explained why he has satisfied each of them.

1 Although the State's brief is not entirely clear, it seems that at one point it may suggest
that Mr. Ellington has argued for application of the modified version of the Drapeau test
that was discussed in Ellington I. (See Resp. Br., p.9 (discussing the modified Drapeau
test created in Ellington I, and asserting that "Ellington's attempts to draw parallels
between this case and Ellington I are misguided").) To be clear, Mr. Ellington has not
argued for application of the modified Drapeau standard; he already conceded that the
regular Drapeau standard controls. (See App. Br., p.24 n.21.) This is because the
modified Drapeau standard applies only to new evidence revealing false testimony by "a
state law enforcement officer," Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 74-75, and Mr. Daily, the
witness who testified falsely in Mr. Ellington's second trial, was not a law enforcement
officer.
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In response, the State also analyzes each of the four prongs of the Drapeau test
and claims that Mr. Ellington failed to satisfy any of them. Below, Mr. Ellington explains
fully why the State's analyses are flawed, and why this Court should reverse the district
court's order denying his motion for a new trial.
1.

The Evidence Is Newly Discovered And Was Unknown To The Defendant
At The Time Of Trial

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington pointed out that the record establishes that
the "new evidence" underlying his motion for a new trial-the last paragraph of page
310 of Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction, a textbook co-authored by
Mr. Daily-was unknown to Mr. Ellington, his counsel, and his retained reconstruction
expert at the time of his trial. (App. Br., pp.25-26.)
In response, the State makes absolutely no attempt to argue that Mr. Ellington
(or his lawyers or retained expert) actually knew of the evidence at issue, i.e., the
contents of page 310 of Mr. Daily's textbook. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) Instead, the
State urges this Court to re-write the Drapeau standard by adopting bright-line rules
providing that certain types of evidence can never be deemed "unknown to the
defendant," so as to constitute new evidence for purposes of a motion for a new trial.
First, the State "submits that evidence that is properly disclosed to the defense prior to
trial may never constitue evidence 'unknown to the defendant at the time of trial"'; next,
the State "asserts that the type of evidence proposed in this case-previously published
scholarship material-cannot generally constitute 'new evidence' for the purposes of a
motion for a new trial where there is no assertion of perjury." (Resp. Br., p.10.) The
State then suggests that because the evidence at issue in this case allegedly falls into
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these categories, it must be deemed to have been known to the defendant.

(Resp.

Br., pp.10-12.)
The State's arguments fail on many levels. First, the first prong of the Drapeau
test is a purely subjective test; it is unequivocally couched in terms of what was actually
known to the defendant.

See Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691 ("the evidence is newly

discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial"). Accordingly, this
first prong is not susceptible to any bright-line rules, as such rules would tend to turn
this subjective standard into some sort of objective test. And, in this case, applying the
subjective standard of Drapeau's first prong, it is quite obvious that Mr. Ellington, his
attorneys, and his retained expert did not have any actual knowledge of the contents of
page 310 of Mr. Daily's textbook.

(See REx., pp.904 (Mr. Rochford's affidavit,

indicating he did not review Mr. Daily's textbook until after Mr. Daily testified); 4/24112
Tr., p.8, LS.10-20 (Mr. Rochford's testimony that he received Mr. Daily's textbook
approximately three weeks after Mr. Ellington's trial was over).)
Second, the State has cited absolutely no authority supporting the bright-line
rules for which it advocates. (See Resp. Sr., pp.10-11.) And, indeed, there appears to
be none. Further, the State offers a policy argument in support of only one of its two
proposed bright-line rules, and even that argument is both cursory and poorly
conceived.

(See Resp. Sr., pp.10-11.) Specifically, the State argues that a unique,

bright-line rule ought to apply to previously published scholarship material because,
without such a modification of the first prong of Drapeau, defendants will exploit the
Drapeau standard to win "do-overs" by doing nothing more than identifying, with the

benefit of hindsight, already-existing scholarship concerning matters litigated at trial.
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(Resp. Br., pp.1 0-11.) However, the State makes no contention that this has ever been
a problem in the nearly forty years since Drapeau was first decided. Nor is it likely to
become a problem in the future, given the other three prongs of the Drapeau standard,
which dramatically restrict a defendant's ability to win a new trial.

In light of this, the

State has made an utterly unconvincing argument for this Court to dramatically alter the
current Drapeau standard. 2
Third, the State's argument rests on a couple of faulty premises.

Initially, in

asserting that this Court should adopt a bright-line rule "that evidence that is properly
disclosed to the defense prior to trial may never constitue evidence 'unknown to the
defendant at the time of trial,'" the State seems to suggest that Mr. Ellington knowing of
the existence of Mr. Daily's textbook is the same as him knowing all of the information
contained within that textbook. (Resp. Br., p.1 0.) It is not clear whether this suggestion
stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of what Mr. Ellington contends the new
evidence to be in this case (which would be quite inexcusable given that Ellington
explained very carefully in his opening brief that the new evidence is the information
contained on page 310 of Mr. Daily's textbook (see App. Sr., pp.25-26)), or whether it
instead stems from the State's belief that simply knowing of the existence of a book is
actually the same thing as knowing the information contained within the book (which,

2 "When there is controlling precedent on questions of Idaho law 'the rule of stare
decisis dictates that [appellate courts] follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it
has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.'"
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592 (2006)
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983
(1990)). As the State has failed to show that the first prong of the Drapeau standard is
manifestly wrong, unjust or unwise, or inconsistent with plain, obvious principles of law
or justice, it should not be altered.
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although it would be a boon to students everywhere, unfortunately, is not how the world
works).
The other faulty premise underlies the State's request for a bright-line rule that
"previously published scholarship material-cannot generally constitute 'new evidence'
for the purposes of a motion for a new trial where there is no assertion of perjury."
(Resp. Br., p.10 (emphasis added).)

The State's implication here is that, unlike in

Ellington /, Mr. Ellington has not alleged that the State's expert committed perjury. (See

Resp. Br., p.10.) However, Mr. Ellington has alleged the same thing in this appeal as
he alleged in Ellington

I~that

the State's expert gave false testimony under oath. (See

App. Br., pp.1, 14, 17, 22, 23, 26.) In layman's terms, this is an allegation of perjury;
however, whether Mr. Daily committed the felony offense of perjury, as defined by
I.C. § 18-5401, is not for Mr. Ellington to decide.

Fourth, in proposing a series of bright-line rules under which a defendant will be
deemed to have known certain things at his trial, regardless of whether he actually knew
those things, the State's argument really seems to be that there are certain types of
evidence for which it is unreasonable for the defendant to claim a lack of knowledge.
(See Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) At its core then, the State's argument seems to be that it is

unreasonable for Mr. Ellington to claim a lack of knowledge of the contents of page 310
of Mr. Daily's textbook when he and his attorneys were on notice that the textbook
existed. However, this argument is more properly presented under Drapeau's fourth
prong (addressed immediately below)-whether the evidence in question should,
through reasonable diligence, have been discovered by the defense.
Br., pp.10-11.)
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(See Resp.

In sum, the State simply does not have a credible argument under Drapeau's first
prong.

That prong of the Drapeau test speaks in terms of the defendant's actual

knowledge of the evidence at issue. And here, it is simply undeniable that Mr. Ellington,
his attorneys, and his retained expert had no actual knowledge of the contents of page
310 of Mr. Daily's textbook.

2.

The Failure To Learn Of The Evidence Is Due To No Lack Of Diligence On
The Part Of The Defendant

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the contents of page 310 of
Mr. Daily's textbook-the new evidence at issue in this

appeal~was

could have reasonably discovered, even with due diligence.

not evidence he

(App. Br., pp.27-28.)

Specifically, Mr. Ellington argued that, given the unique facts and circumstances of this
case, i.e., the very late disclosure of Mr. Daily's second report, which was the first notice
the defense had that Mr. Daily's opinions were based in part on calculations utilizing a
certain rotational mechanics formula,

Mr. Ellington could

not reasonably have

discovered the limitations of that formula, as discussed on page 310 of one of
Mr. Oai/y's textbooks. (App. Br., pp.27-28.) He argued that, unless or until he had a
basis to know what the prosecution expert's opinion was and how it was derived and,
therefore, what he would need to look for in investigating that expert's background and
analysis, it would be wholly unreasonable to hold him to a standard of having to be
aware of the contents of every writing that the State's expert has ever produced in the
field of accident reconstruction. (App. Br., p.28.)
In response, the State claims "[d]ue diligence required Ellington to be familiar
with the portions of the disclosed material relevant to the Blazer's post-impact rotation."
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(Resp. Br., p.13.) The State offers a fair amount of argument on this point (see Resp.
Br., pp.11-15); however, for the reasons set forth below, its argument is not persuasive.
First, the State attempts to call into question Mr. Ellington's claim that the State
did not disclose Mr. Daily's second report until after the trial had begun. (See Resp.
Sr., p.12 n.4.)

The State suggests that, because the report was dated Sunday,

January 15, 2012, which was three days prior to the trial commencing, it could be that
the report was actually disclosed prior to trial. (See Resp. Br., p.12 n.4.) In suggesting
as much though, the State, with no evidence in hand, asks this Court to assume that
defense counsel lied to the district court (in contravention of her ethical obligations)
when she represented to the court that, "A supplemental report was given to the
defense after trial began" (R. Ex, p.867 (emphasis added). (See Resp. Br., p.12 n.4.)
The State further seeks to have this Court believe that when the defense expert,
Mr. Rochford, later testified-consistently with defense counsel's representation that the
report was not disclosed until the trial had begun-that he did not receive Mr. Daily's
second report until the trial had begun (4/24/12 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.11), that must
have been because defense counsel had failed to timely provide the report to
Mr. Rochford. (See Resp. Br., p.12 n.4.) Again, the State offers absolutely no evidence
to support its suggestion.

(See Resp. Br., p.12 n.4.) Obviously then, this is baseless

speculation on the State's part. The only credible interpretation of the record is that, as
defense counsel represented to the district court, Mr. Daily's second report was not
disclosed to the defense until after Mr. Ellington's trial had begun.
Second, the State argues that even before its receipt of Mr. Daily's second
report, the defense was on notice "that the impact of the BlazerlSubaru collision on the
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subsequent movement of the Blazer would be an issue at triaL"

(Resp. Br., p.12.)

While the State's assertion-that the movement of the Blazer would be an issue at
trial-is correct, it does not support the State's apparent conclusion-that the defense
was on notice that it needed to review Mr. Daily's writings on the topic of rotational
mechanics and, specifically, the formula discussed on page 310 of Mr. Daily's textbook.
Indeed, in his opening brief, Mr. Ellington readily conceded that Mr. Daily's original
report, which was produced well in advance of trial, stated as follows:
Ellington accelerated the Blazer to the left side of the Subaru, sideswiping
it on its left front corner with the driver's side rocker panel and door of the
Blazer. This impact caused minor damage to both vehicles, and it was
unlikely there was any redirection from this impact.
Ellington turned to the left, even though the eastbound lane was open to
him, and continued to accelerate toward the Honda Accord containing the
Larsen sisters ....

(App. Br., p.? n.6 (quoting R., p.705) (emphasis in App. Br.).) However, as he went on
to explain in that opening brief, the mere fact that it was Mr. Daily's opinion that the
Larsens' Subaru did not cause Mr. Ellington's Blazer to rotate into the girls' Honda did
not apprise the defense of the need to review Mr. Daily's textbooks or other writings;
and, in the absence of any particular methodology or calculations being disclosed, it
certainly did not put the defense on notice that it had to look into rotational mechanics
generally or, more specifically, the rotational mechanics formula appearing on page 310
of Mr. Daily's Fundamental of Traffic Crash Reconstruction. (See App. Br., p.7 & n.6,
p.28.)

Indeed, at that point in the case, the defense would have had absolutely no

reason to investigate Mr. Daily's writings on rotational mechanics because they could
not have known that Mr. Daily's conclusions would be based on this improper analysis.
As both Mr. Rochford and a second defense expert, John Howell, later made clear, the

14

question of how fast the Larsens' Subaru was going when it hit Mr. Ellington's Blazer
should have been analyzed through conservation of momentum and conservation of
energyanalsyses. (R., p.714 (affidavit of John Howell); R. Ex., p.905 (affidavit of David
Rochford).) In other words, because the defense had no basis to know that Mr. Daily
would use the wrong framework to analyze the collision between the Subaru in the
Blazer, it had no reason to scour Mr. Daily's writings to look for the limitations of a
formula that has no application to this case in the first place.
Third, the State argues that the fact the defense did not seek a continuance of
the trial based on its late receipt of Mr. Daily's second report proves that Mr. Ellington
was not dilligent in investigating Mr. Daily's opinions. (Resp. Sr., p.13.) However, the
State has failed to show that a motion for a continuance, made after the trial had begun,
would have had any effect on his ability to investigate Mr. Daily's opinions. (See Resp.
Br., p.13.) Indeed, the record makes it clear that any such motion WOUld, most likely,
have been denied by the district court anyway. On December 1, 2011, roughly a month
and a half prior to Mr. Ellington's trial date, the defense had filed a motion for a
continuance based on the fact that it had fired its original reconstruction expert,
Dr. Wilson "Toby" Hayes (based on the fact that Dr. Hayes had recently been hired by
the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney under circumstances which caused the
defense to question Dr. Hayes' ethics generally, and created a possible conflict of
interest for Dr. Hayes, Mr. Ellington's attorneys, or both), and retained Mr. Rochford,
who needed time to get up to speed on the case. (See R., p.226; 12/2/11 Tr., p.4, L.25
- p.7, L.25, p.10, L.2 - p.12, L.4.)

However, the district court promptly denied that

motion, citing, in part, its concern that Mr. Ellington's trial proceed as expeditiously as
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possible. 3

(See 12/2/11 Tr., p.1

L.5

p.13, L.11, p.15, Ls.7-11.)

Accordingly, it

cannot reasonably be said that due diligence demanded that Mr. Ellington have pursued
a likely futile motion for a continuance.
Fourth, the State contends that Mr. Ellington's attorneys failed to exercise due
diligence insofar as they fired Dr. Hayes and hired Mr. Rochford just six weeks prior to
trial, because Mr. Rochford "may have been unfamiliar with Daily's prior publications,
and ill-preapred to assist Ellington's defense in challenging Daily's testimony." (Resp.
Br., pp.13-14.) However, the State's contentions with regard to the two experts' relative
level of preparedness is nothing more than wild speculation on the State's part. Further,
the State fails to acknowledge that it was the prosecutor's highly questionable tactic of
hiring Dr. Hayes on another criminal case right before Mr. Ellington's trial that forced the
defense to retain the services of a new reconstruction expert.

(See note 3, supra

(explaining the ethical dilemma that the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
knowingly put defense counsel in by hiring Dr. Hayes); App. Br., p.8 n.7 (explaining
Dr. Hayes' questionable conduct in agreeing to work for the prosecution in the very
same matter in which he had already done work for the defendants).)

Because

Mr. Ellington was forced (by the State's actions) to hire a new reconstruction expert on

The district court's other reason for denying the motion for a continuance was that it
did not grasp the ethical problems for Mr. Ellington's attorneys where they had rely on
Dr. Hayes as an expert witness (with whom all communications would be protected by
the attorney work-product doctrine) in one case, while also having to treat him as an
adverse witness, potentially subject to cross-examination, in another case. (See
12/2/11 Tr., p.13, L.13 - p.15, L.6; see a/so 12/2/11 Tr., p.6, LS.3-17 (defense counsel
explaining that she and her co-counsel were also the attorneys for the defense on the
case in which Dr. Hayes had recently been hired by the prosecution (specifically, the
same prosecutor who was prosecuting Mr. Ellington».)
3
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the eve of trial, it can hardly be said that Mr. Ellington's hiring of that expert proves a
lack of diligence.
Fifth, the State claims that "the essence of Ellington's challenge is that his trial
attorney should have more thoroughly prepared for, or challenged the admission of
Daily's testimony, or sought a continuance to better prepare for it, or retained a more
competent expert witness in a relevant field."

(Resp. Br., pp.14-15.)

It makes this

claim, apparently, so that it can then go on to assert that, "Such a challenge is better
suited for a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim." (Resp. Sr., p.15.)
The problem, however, is that the State's primary contention is patently false.
Mr. Ellington has never argued that his trial counsel was at fault; nor has he ever hinted
at any such claim. (See generally App. Sr.) Rather, it is the State that has tried to
argue that the lack of discovery of the evidence proving the falsity of Mr. Daily's trial
testimony was owing to a lack of diligence on the part of counsel.

(See Resp.

Sr., pp.11-14 (arguing that Mr. Ellington should have discovered the evidence in
question based on an adequate investigation of Mr. Daily's initial report, that defense
counsel should have moved for a continuance, and that defense counsel should not
have hired a new expert on the eve of trial).) Accordingly, the State's assertion that
Mr. Ellington's claims are best raised in post-conviction is nothing more than a
strawman argument which should be ignored. 4
Finally, in keeping with the arguments made regarding the first prong of the
Drapeau standard, the State argues that Mr. Ellington should have known of the

Obviously, if Mr. Ellington were to allege the ineffective assistance of counsel-in this,
or any other, context-then he will do so through a petition for post-conviction relief.
However, such claims are not currently before this Court.

4
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contents of page 310 of Mr. Daily's textbook because, as a bright-line rule, "[a1t the very
least, it is reasonable to expect a defendant exercising due diligence to review a state
expert witnesses' [sic] qualifications and publications relevant to their expected
testimony prior to trial and/or to retain defense counsel capable of doing so." (Resp.
Br., p.14; see also Resp. Br., pp.10-11 (State's proposed bright-line rules regarding
what is deemed to be known to the defendant).)

However, what constitutes a

reasonable investigation varies from case to case, depending on the unique facts and
circumstances of the case. For example, where a State's expert is a relative newcomer
and has not written, spoken, or testified extensively, it may be reasonable for the
defense to peruse every piece of information available on that expert. Likewise, even if
the expert has produced a large body of work, if the anticipated testimony is on a
discreet topic, it may be reasonable for the defense to review all of that individual's work
on that narrow topic.

However, where, as here, the expert has many years of

experience, and has written, spoken, and/or testified extensively in the fields of accident
reconstruction,5 and the State has disclosed no specifics with regard to its expert's
analysis, it would be absurd to say that the defendant, his court-appointed attorneys,
and his own State-funded expert should have familarized themselves with everything
the State's expert ever wrote or said about accident reconstruction generally. Had the
State earlier disclosed

Mr.

Daily's anticipated testimony concerning

rotational

mechanics or, more specifically, the formula appearing on page 310 of Mr. Daily's

5 Mr. Daily testified that he has been involved in accident investigation and
reconstruction since 1979, and that, in that time, he has testified as an expert witness in
the field of accident reconstruction between 50 and 100 times. (See Tr., p.853, L.9 p.856, L.2.) In addition, as was noted in Mr. Ellington's opening brief, Mr. Daily has
18

textbook, it may have been reasonable to expect the defense team to have reviewed all
of Mr. Daily's work on that narrow topic. Thus, under the facts and circumstances of
this case, due diligence did not require the defense to have known about the limitations
of a specific formula, buried in one of the multiple textbooks authored by Mr. Daily, and
which seemingly had no application to Mr. Daily's expected testimony-at least until
such time as Mr. Daily's second report was disclosed revealing his improper reliance on
that formula, at which time it was too late to obtain the textbook in question and uncover
the falsity of the testimony Mr. Daily would give just a couple days later. 6

3.

The Evidence Is Material, Not Merely Cumulative Or Impeaching

In his Appellant's Brief, although he conceded that the new evidence at issue in
this case certainly undermines Mr. Daily's credibility, as it makes him appear to be a liar
generally, Mr. Ellington argued that this new evidence is material within the meaning of
the second prong of the Drapeau test. (App. Br., pp.29-30.) Specifically, he argued that
the information on page 310 of Mr. Daily's textbook could have been admitted for its
truth pursuant to I.R.E. 803(18) (the hearsay exception for learned treatises), and that a
certain rotational mechanics formula

cannot be used to measure the magnitude of the

impact needed to have rotated Mr. Ellington's Blazer toward the Larsen girls' Honda.
(App. Br., p.30.)
The State's response is best summed up by the following passage in its
Respondent's Brief:

written extensively on accident reconstruction, and has taught in that field as well. (See
App. Br., pp.27-28.)
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Ellington presented no expert testimony at his second trial, and thus
offered no supported alternative defense theory regarding the impact of
the Blazer/Subaru collision on the Blazer's subsequent movements. Nor
did Ellington attempt to utilize the content of Daily's textbook to recalculate the impact of the Honda/Subaru [sic] collision to support an
alternative theory in the context of his motion for a new trial. 7 Instead,
Ellington offered the textbook excerpts only to attack Daily's testimony,
i.e., as impeachment evidence.
(Resp. Br., p.16 (footnote added).) The State's reasoning is flawed.
First, insofar as the State takes issue with Mr. Ellington's experts not utilizing
Mr. Daily's rotational mechanics formula, adjusting for the low angle of incidence, and
attempting to correct Mr. Daily's calculations, the fact is that there is no reason why
Mr. Ellington's experts should have tried to utilize a rotational mechanics framework to
re-calculate the speeds or speed changes associated with the Subaru's collision with
Mr. Ellington's Blazer. As Mr. Ellington's experts have made abundantly clear, and as
Mr. Daily's own textbook reveals, the rotational mechanics formula appearing on page
310 of Mr. Daily's textbook simply had no application in this case; the correct framework
within which to understand the collision between the Subaru and the Blazer is through
conservation of momentum/conservation of energy principles. (See R, p.714 (affidavit
of John Howell); REx., p.905 (affidavit of David Rochford); REx., p.948 (page 310 of
Mr. Daily's textbook).) Thus, Mr. Ellington's experts could not have used Mr. Daily's
rotational mechanics theory to re-calculate the speed change.
Second, insofar as the State takes issue with Mr. Ellington's experts not utilizing
a conservation of momentum/conservation of energy analysis to calculate the relevant

As noted above, Mr. Daily's second report was not disclosed to the defense until after
Mr. Ellington's trial began. Mr. Daily then testified for the State starting at the end of the
fourth day of the trial. (See Tr., p.848, L.12.)
6
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speeds or speed changes, it should be noted that, although both defense experts
agreed that the collision between the Subaru and the Blazer should be understood
utilizing conservation of momentum/conservation of energy principles (see R., p.714;
R. Ex., p.90S), in his report, Mr. Rochford explained that "[t]here are no reliable
reconstruction methods available to determine the speeds of the vehicles at impact with
each other. The collision between the Blazer and the Subaru was a sideswipe .... "
(Rochford Report, p.1S.) Furthermore, there was no need for the defense experts to
attempt to correct Mr. Daily's speed-related calculations.

As Mr. Rochford's report

made clear, the tire marks left at the scene are sufficient to demonstrate that when the
Larsens drove into the side of Mr. Ellington's Blazer, they caused his Blazer to rotate to
the left, in the approximate direction of their daughters' Honda. (See Rochford Report,
pp.16, 17, 18.)
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Mr. Ellington need not have presented the
testimony of his experts at trial in order to show that the new evidence in question is
material. This is because evidence need not fit a larger theme in order to be material.
As was discussed in Mr. Ellington's opening brief, in Ellington I, the Supreme
Court endorsed, and expanded upon, a basic distinction between impeachment
evidence and substantive evidence that had previously been articulated by the Court of
Appeals.

(See App. Br., p.29 (quoting Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 74 (quoting State v.

Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69 (Ct. App. 2004))).) According to the Supreme Court,

'''impeachment [evidence] is that which is designed to discredit a witness,'" whereas

It is not clear which portion of Mr. Daily's textbook thinks Mr. Ellington's experts should
have utilized to analyze the Subaru's collision with the Blazer-the rotational mechanics
section, or the sections on conservation of momentum and conservation of energy.

7
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material or substantive evidence is "'evidence which is offered for the purpose of
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition'" or has "'some logical
connection with the consequential facts.'" Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 74 (quoting Marsh
(first two quotes) and Black's Law Dictionary (third quote».

Under these definitions,

there is absolutely no requirement that the evidence in question fit a prevailing theme or
theory of the case, or that it be offered in conjunction with other evidence; this evidence
may be material on its own.

And the fact is that this new evidence-evidence that

rotational mechanics formulas have no application in this case-while certainly
discrediting to Mr. Daily, also could have been offered for the purpose of persuading the
trier of fact that it did not take an extraordinarily forceful crash for the Subaru's impact to
have caused Mr. Ellington's Blazer to have rotated toward the girls' Honda. Certainly
this evidence has some logical connection with consequential facts in the case, i.e.,
whether Mr. Ellington's Blazer was spun into the girls' Honda, or whether he steered his
Blazer into the girls' Honda. Therefore, it is material, not merely impeaching.

4.

The Evidence Would Probably Have Produced An Acquittal

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington asserted that the new evidence at issue in
this case would likely have produced an acquittal had it been presented at his trial.
(App. Br., pp.30-32.) Specifically, he argued that this evidence, which suggests he did
not steer his Blazer into the Larsen girls' Honda, was absolutely critical to the case
because: (a) the State's theory of the case was that Mr. Ellington intentionally crashed
the girls Honda, then intentionally ran down Mrs. Larsen; and (b) in arguing this "intent"
theory to the jury, the State's theme was "choice," i.e., the State argued that
Mr. Ellington chose to twice drive his Blazer to the left-first to strike the Honda, and
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then chose to strike Mrs. Larsen. (App. Br., pp.30-32; see a/so App. Br., p.11 (providing
extensive citations to the trial transcript substantiating Mr. Ellington's characterization of
the State's theory and theme).)
In response, the State offers a number of reasons why it believes that the new
evidence revealing its expert's false testimony would not have likely resulted in an
acquittal had it been offered at trial. (Resp. Br., pp.17 -23.) For the reasons set forth
below, noneof these arguments have merit.
First, the State argues that the new evidence, which relates to the question of
whether Mr. Ellington steered his Blazer toward the girls' Honda, is only relevant to the
aggravated battery charges (arising out of Mr. Ellington crashing into the Honda), not
the murder charge (arising out of Mr. Ellington striking Mrs. Larsen a few seconds later).
(See Resp. Sr., pp.17-18.)
R., p.838.)

This is the same mistake the district court made. (See

However, as was explained in Mr. Ellington's opening brief, because the

State's theory of the case was "intent," and its theme in arguing this theory to the jury
was "choice," and because a lay juror's inclination would to believe that if Mr. Ellington
intended to hit the girls, he probably intended to strike Mrs. Larsen as well, any
evidence tending to indicate that Mr. Ellington intentionally struck the girls' Honda also
tends to indicate that Mr. Ellington also acted intentionally when he struck Mrs. Larsen
just a few short seconds later. 8 (See App. Br., p.31.) And, by parity of reasoning, if the

It is interesting that the State now wishes to parse out, as distinct acts (with potentially
different states of mind), Mr. Ellington's collision with the girls' Honda and, just a few
seconds later, his collision with Mrs. Larsen. At trial, the prosecutor urged the jurors to
believe that Mr. Ellington had been in some sort of continuous state of rage that
morning. (See, e.g., Tr., p.315, L.17 - p.316, L.12 ("The evidence in this case is going
to show that on January 1S \ 2006, Mr. Ellington used his vehicle ... as a weapon
against three different women, two sisters and their mother. ... The motivation or the
8
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evidence showed Mr. Ellington did not intentionally strike the girls' Honda, the jury's
inference would be that he also did not intentionally strike Mrs. Larsen.

(See App.

Sr., pp.31-32.)
Second, the State attempts to argue that Mr. Ellington has not shown that
Mr. Daily's testimony was actually false; it claims that his use of the rotational
mechanics formula is not necessarily inconsistent with the information contained on
page 310 of his Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction textbook.

(Resp.

Sr., pp.18-20.) In furtherance of this contention, the State offers two theories by which
the information on page 310 would not be inconsistent with Mr. Daily's testimony.

It

begins by pointing out that Mr. Daily's textbook merely "recommends" not attempting to
use the rotational mechanics formula in analyzing collisions where the angle of
incidence is less than 45 degrees; the State argues that the textbook "did not expressly
state" that the formula cannot be used.

(Resp. Sr., p.19.)

However, looking at the

context in which Mr. Daily's "recommendation" was made reveals clearly that the
rotational mechanics formula should not have been used in this case. In the textbook,
Mr. Daily wrote that, for collisions occurring at an angle less than 90 degrees, the
formula must be adjusted based on the angle, but because the formula becomes less
reliable as the angle of incidence approaches 0 degrees, the formula should not be
used for collisions that are less than 45 degrees. (R., Ex., p.948.) Thus, because the

reason that this occurred is because Mr. Ellington was angry. Again, the evidence will
show that early that morning, around 6:00 or 6:30 a.m., January 1S t. 2006, he got into an
argument with his then fiance .... ").) And even on appeal, the State apparently wants
this Court to think that Mr. Ellington lashed out the Larsen family because he was in a
state of continuous rage over an argument with his fiance. (See Resp. Br., p.1 (State,
beginning its statement of facts with an allegation that, "At 3:30 [a.m.], Ellington got in a
disagreement with his live-in girlfriend .... ") (alteration in original).)
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sideswipe collision in this case involved an angle of incidence that was less than 15
degrees, the formula relied upon by Mr. Daily was at its least reliable, and was well
below the threshhold at which it should not have been used at all.
Alternatively, the State reasons that Mr. Daily did not testify falsely at
Mr. Ellington's trial because, when called upon to explain himself, Mr. Daily said he did
not testify falsely at Mr. Ellington's trial. (See Resp. Br., p.20.) In particular, the State
points out that Mr. Daily claimed to have somehow adjusted his calculations to account
for the shallow angle of incidence in this case by "calculat[ing] the length of the 'lever
arm,' which he explained to be the force that causes the rotation, which exists between
the collision impact and the center of mass of the vehicle." (Resp. Br., p.20.) However,
this appears to make no sense whatsoever.

Preliminarily, Mr. Daily's own textbook

states that one should not even attempt to use the rotational mechanics formula where
the angle of incidence is shallower than 45 degrees. (R., Ex., p.948.) Because the
angle of incidence in this case was 15 degrees or less, even a "proper" adjustment of
the formula would not yield a reliable solution.

(See R., Ex., p.948.) Moreover, the

adjustment that Mr. Daily claims to have made in this case does not appear to be the
adjustment called for in his textbook. While the textbook asserts that, "[i]f the striking
vehicle comes in at an angle different than 90 0 , then force acting to create the torque
must be adjusted by a factor defined as the sine of the angle of incidence." (R., Ex.,
p.776.) However, in this case, Mr. Daily's calculations apparently did not determine, or
even assume, an angle of incidence, much less adjust the force acting to create the
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torque by the sine of that angle of incidence. 9

(See R., pp.769-71 (Mr. Daily's

calculations).) Rather, Mr. Daily's calculations simply assumed a lever arm length of
two feet. 1O (4/24/12 Tr., p.54, Ls. 21-25; R., p.771.) This does not appear to be the
adjustment called for by Mr. Daily's textbook.
In light of the foregoing, it seems reasonably apparent that the defense experts
were absolutely correct when they asserted that Mr. Daily's calculations and ultimate
conclusions at trial were plainly improper in light of the information contained on page
310 of his textbook, Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction, as well as their own
knowledge of accident reconstruction.
Third, the State argues that, even had the apparent falsity of Mr. Daily's
testimony come out at trial, the jury still may have chosen to believe Mr. Daily based on
his impressive credentials and, therefore, it cannot be said that the new evidence likely
would have led to an acquittal. (Resp. Br., p.21.) Mr. Ellington submits that this is a
silly assumption; if confronted with evidence that Mr. Daily had clearly testified falsely
and that, contrary to his testimony, it cannot be mathematically proven that Mr. Ellington
steered his Blazer into the girls' Honda, Mr. Ellington believes the jurors would have
rendered a verdict based on the evidence, not Mr. Daily's otherwise impressive
credentials.
Fourth, the State argues that there is other evidence to substantiate Mr. Daily's
ultimate conclusion that Subaru's impact did not cause Mr. Ellington's Blazer to rotate

9 Assuming an angle of incidence of 15 degrees (which is equivalent to 0.26 radians),
the sine of that angle equals .2588. The sine of a smaller angle WOUld, likewise, be
smaller.
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toward the girls' Honda-namely, acceleration marks which indicate that wheels of the
Blazer were tumed to the left after it was hit by the Subaru, and a lack of serious
damage done to either the Subaru or the Blazer in their collision. (Resp. Br.,

pp.21~22.)

However, the fact that the wheels on the Blazer were turned to the left after the collision
from the Subaru, on its own, means very little, as it must be remembered that
Mr. Ellington was swerving his Blazer around the Larsen's Subaru on the soft shoulder,
and would have had his wheels turned to the left in an attempt to regain the roadway,
when he was broadsided by the Larsens. Further, the lack of serious damage to either
vehicle is virtually meaningless if it is impossible to calculate the magnitude of crash
necessary to have rotated the Blazer into the girls' Honda.
Finally, the State contends that evidence of Mr. Daily's false testimony would not
likely have resulted in an acquittal because Mr. Ellington did not offer an altemate
explanation-through an expert opinion-as to how his Blazer wound up smashing into
the girls' Honda. (Resp. Br., p.22.) Insofar as the State contends Mr. Ellington never
offered such evidence "in the context of the motion for a new trial," the State's claim is
untrue. (See Resp. Br., p.22.) Mr. Ellington supported his motion for a new trial with
Mr. Rochford's report, which indicated that, in fact, the impact from the Subaru to rotate
toward the girls' Honda. (See App. Br., pp.8-9 (quoting extensively from Mr. Rochford's
report).)

Further, insofar as the State contends Mr. Ellington never offered such

evidence at trial, the State is correct, but its point is irrelevant. Mr. Ellington never had
any obligation to offer any evidence at trial, much less any expert testimony; he was

What the length of the lever arm has to do with the sine of the angle of incidence,
Mr. Daily never explained. Nor did Mr. Daily explain why he assumed a lever arm
length of two feet.
10
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free to reply upon the State's own evidence (or lack thereof) to maintain the jurors'
reasonable doubt. Indeed, were it revealed that the State's expert testified falsely, and
that contrary to his conclusion, Mr. Ellington did not steer his Blazer into the girls'
Honda, there would be no inference that Mr. Ellington intentionally hit anyone. This,
coupled with the key facts that Mr. Ellington was chased at high speeds, he was
rammed broadside while trying to swerve around the Larsens' Subaru, and he was shot
at before he ever struck Mrs. Larsen, makes it clear that he probably would have been
acquitted.
D.

Alternatively, To The Extent That This Court Cannot Fully Evaluate The Question
Of Whether Mr. Ellington Was Improperly Denied A New Trial Owing To The
District Court's Misunderstanding Of The New Evidence Presented, This Case
Should Be Remanded For Further Proceedings
Because the State has chosen not to respond to Mr. Ellington's alternative

argument (see generally Resp. Br.), no further response is required herein.

Rather,

Mr. Ellington simply refers this Court back to the portions of his Appellant's Brief in
which he discussed the district court's misunderstanding of what the new evidence was

(see App. Br., pp.20, 23, 25-26, 26-27), and his argument that, to the extent that the
district court's misunderstanding of the nature of the new evidence so tainted its
analysis of Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial that it is impossible for this Court to
affirmatively say the district court should have granted that motion, it should at least
vacate the order denying the motion and remand the case for further consideration of
the motion (see App. Br., p.32).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Ellington respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion for a new trial, and that it remand his case to the district court for a
third trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the order denying his motion
for a new trial, and that it remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of February, 2014.

Chief, Appellate Unit
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